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INTRODUCTION 
As an area of inquiry the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has 
long been marked by an almost total absence of public and scholarly 
attention. This is no longer the case. The CIA has become the subject 
of a virtual information explosion. Revelations before the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees, memoirs and exposés, and newspa-
per accounts have brought an end to the Agency's "splendid isolation." 
These writings have served as a valuable source of insights into the 
structure and operation of the CIA. Yet, on balance, one cannot help 
but feel that the insights produced to date are less than what they 
might be. A recent review of the literature by Roger Hilsman draws 
a similar and unencouraging conclusion.1 Hilsman examines a broad 
range of recent writings on intelligence for their contribution to our 
understanding of intelligence as organization, information, know-
ledge, covert action, and of the role of secret intelligence in a free 
society. In his opinion, faults and shortcomings repeatedly negate the 
possible contributions that many of these works may have made to 
our understanding of intelligence. 
These inadequacies are in a large measure due to the dominance 
of memoirs and exposés in the CIA literature.- A point of diminishing 
returns has been reached. The primary need is no longer for addi-
tional pieces of information, which memoirs and exposés are capable 
of providing but for frameworks and theories which will allow us to 
think creatively and thoughtfully about the CIA. This is not to say 
that very real data problems do not now exist or that they will not 
forever make research in this area difficult. These difficulties are well 
recognized and have often been cited by scholars and others as a 
reason for not studying the CIA. The position taken in this paper is 
that such an approach to intelligence policy generally, and the CIA 
specifically, is unwarranted and ill-advised in a democratic society. 
As with the issues of nuclear power, arms control, and environ-
mental health hazards, arguments for leaving the study of the CIA 
to the experts are based on a misreading of the nature of professional 
knowledge and the role of the professional in the policy process.:( 
Rationality and objectivity are commonly perceived to be the hall-
marks of professional decision making. Yet, the process of "truth 
creation" engaged in by professionals is in reality quite similar to that 
frequently observed in the political arena. Frederick Mosher asserts 
that important decisions are likely to be the product of intra-profes-
sional deliberations and Morton Halperin adds that 'simple rules of 
thumb' (SOPs) and compromises often provide the basis for these 
decisions.4 
21 
Summer 1984 
Four related considerations point to the necessity of moving to-
ward a more theoretically grounded and objective study of the CIA. 
First, additional facts will not make the correct answers any more self-
evident. Facts are not self-interpreting. They gain meaning only when 
placed in a conceptual context which makes possible the categorization 
and ordered comparison of information. The development of con-
ceptual frameworks is especially important in the study of the CIA 
because of the highly contradictory and often suspect nature of the 
assertions which can emerge from the "I was there when the decision 
was made" type of writing in international politics to which CIA mem-
oirs and exposés belong. 
Second, the limited amount of data available in the study of the 
CIA makes it imperative that frameworks and theories be employed 
to guide research efforts. The CIA will never be a subject as open to 
scholarly study as are other institutions in a democratic political sys-
tem. To some extent data problems will always exist. They need not 
prevent research from being undertaken on the Agency, and there 
has already been a vast increase in the amount of information avail-
able. However, the use of theories and frameworks will further aid 
research, as the simplifying assumptions made in the construction of 
a theory or framework direct our attention to specific types and cat-
egories of information. Researchers are thereby relieved of the need 
to absorb all available information about the CIA; only that infor-
mation relevant to the questions posed by the framework needs to be 
collected. Of course, this does not mean that the necessary information 
will be easily acquired, but it will serve to direct creative energies and 
thinking. Thus, researchers are more likely to emerge with answers 
to meaningful questions rather than to possess a surfeit of information 
relating only to trivial matters. 
A third consideration relates to the needs of policy makers. Writ-
ing on the need for a policy science approach to the study of inter-
national politics, Alexander George notes that "it is all but impossible 
for short term problems to be taken truly sut generis; some amount of 
categorization, labeling, and comparison with past events is inevita-
ble."5 Unfortunately, policy makers are not very good at learning from 
the past. They tend to apply oversimplified or irrelevant labels and 
concepts to the problem at hand.6 Well founded insights concerning 
the structure and operation of the CIA would be valuable to planners 
in a number of contemporary policy areas. 
There are several areas which spring immediately to mind. For 
example, does controlling the CIA require a charter or are executive 
orders sufficient to guarantee compliance with laws and policy direc-
tives?7 Can a detailed charter be written given the nature of the in-
telligence function? Are there parallels between the problems of 
controlling the military and controlling the CIA which might help 
policy makers understand the options open to them and the conse-
quences of their choices? Similar considerations relate to talk of "un-
leashing" the CIA. Unleashing would seem to imply that it has already 
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been brought under control, that its dynamics are properly under-
stood, and that a consensus exists on the CIA's limitations and po-
tential as an instrument of foreign policy. Taken as a whole, the CIA 
literature supports none of these inferences. There are also many 
problems associated with the arms control verification capability of 
the intelligence community.8 The competence and limitations of the 
United States' intelligence community in this capacity played a prom-
inent role in the SALT II debate and are likely to remain a major 
point of dispute in future policy debates. 
A final consideration in support of using theoretical frameworks 
to study the CIA is that, whether one acknowledges it or not, one 
makes use of theories in attempting to understand the world. The 
debate therefore should not be whether the CIA can be studied but 
what frameworks are best suited for adding to our knowledge of its 
underlying dynamics. Movement in this direction has begun, though, 
to date, the transition is incomplete.9 It has progressed furthest in the 
application of precepts drawn from psychology as the core framework 
for analyzing intelligence failure and strategic surprise. Elsewhere 
efforts continue to show the pull of the memoir and exposé approach 
to studying the CIA. This is most evident in the publication of con-
ference and symposium papers.10 Contributions to these volumes, 
which are scholarly in approach and style, tend to be overwhelmed 
by articles which are almost completely lacking in references or the-
oretical frameworks. The conclusions drawn and the generalizations 
presented rely heavily on personal experiences. Often too, the articles 
and books are polemical in tone, being not so much studies of the 
CIA as pleas for the pro- or anti-CIA position. 
The remainder of this piece will suggest bodies of literature and 
appropriate issues which hold the potential for increasing our know-
ledge about the CIA. Two broad categories of inquiry, covert action 
and intelligence estimating, will be explored. In each case the discus-
sion is not meant to be exhaustive. It is only intended to spark interest 
in studying the CIA and to point to research questions and oppor-
tunities not currently being considered. Naturally, this brief survey 
offers no assurance that these avenues of research will, if pursued, 
uniformly produce significant findings. As Karl Deutsch points out, 
a concept is a command to search; it is not a guarantee of what shall 
be found." 
COVERT ACTION 
As a tool of statecraft, covert action has not received the quality 
of attention which has characterized writings on the military, economic 
and diplomatic aspects of policy. When pursuing the general discus-
sion of covert action as a means of accomplishing set foreign policy 
goals, two conditions segregate it from other areas of inquiry. The 
first condition is a sense of historical uniqueness. The very term covert 
action is an American creation. Roy Godson noted that even in trans-
lation the concept is difficult to find and that it is explicitly rejected 
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in the Soviet Union where the concept "active measures" incorporates 
both covert and overt means of influencing people.'2 In the 1950s 
and 1960s covert action was embraced by American policy makers 
without any real appreciation of its past successes and failures.13 When 
the efficacy of covert actions as a policy tool was questioned and 
restrictions were placed on it, American policy makers seemed to 
assume that other states would share their new definition of the proper 
place of covert action in international relations. They thus reacted 
with anger to covert Soviet support for Third World revolutionary 
movements. 
The second condition which has marked the literature dealing 
with covert action is a high degree of emotionalism. Here, too, the 
pendulum has swung from one extreme to another. Paul Blackstock 
remarked that at one time covert action and political warfare were 
terms not associated with Western interventionism. Rather they were 
employed "often in a mildly hysterical context" to condemn or expose 
totalitarianism.14 Today this "mildly hysterical context" remains but 
the focus has shifted to attacking Western actions with little or no 
comment being made regarding Soviet undertakings. 
What is lacking is a well-developed, conceptual framework within 
which covert action can be placed and, as a second step, cogent cri-
tiques of that framework. Of those frameworks that do exist, most 
are of the cookbook nature which specify steps to be followed, tactics 
to be used, or typologies of means available to influence secretly the 
internal affairs of other nations.15 The difficulty with this "how to" 
approach is that it does not provide either a normative or instrumental 
basis for evaluating many of the assertions currently being made about 
the technique of covert action. Consider, for example, the following: 
If action capabilities take time to develop, it is also important 
that, once in being, they be used or they will atrophy.16 
The effectiveness of any intelligence service is directly propor-
tional to the degree to which it is prepared to break the laws of 
its adversaries." 
Political assassination in times of peace has . . . no place in the 
American arsenal.18 
Normative Standards 
The justification for the use of covert action as an instrument of 
foreign policy has generally taken one of two forms. It is either con-
tended that covert action is consistent with American values or that 
it is consistent with the values of the societies targeted and is therefore 
acceptable. Ernest Lefever, in arguing the former, suggests that the 
'just war' doctrine provides a point of entry into the Western moral 
tradition which can be used to evaluate the acceptability of a covert 
action undertaking.19 He suggests that the just war' doctrine provides 
three standards which should be used in making this evaluation. First, 
is the objective of the action just? Second, are the means employed 
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both just and appropriate? Third, will the chances for peace be en-
hanced if the action succeeds? Without necessarily rejecting the just 
war' standard, Lefever's formulation can be found wanting in a num-
ber of respects. 
Firstly, Lefever's approach begs the question of what is justice. 
He acknowledges that different definitions exist. He chooses as his 
starting point Western values as embodied in the United Nations 
Charter. Given the general lack of consensus on the norms of inter-
national law and the recent intense hostility of Third World states to 
the Western value system, justifying actions on these grounds seems 
ill-advised. To many who reject Western values this may appear as 
yet another manifestation of Western cultural chauvinism. To others, 
it may serve as the starting point for retaliatory actions. If the West 
can engage in covert actions because they are consistent with its values, 
the Third World may feel free to engage in violence and terrorism 
because it is consistent with its own value system.20 
Secondly, Lefever may be too quick to speak of the "Western 
moral tradition" in this context. Writers on international relations 
consistently speak of the uniqueness of the American style of con-
ceptualizing foreign policy problems. Contrasts with many European 
states are especially vivid in the areas of war, peace, and the nature 
of world politics. These areas are especially germane to an evaluation 
of the acceptability of covert action as an instrument of influence. 
Lefever's formulation also leaves the question of who should authorize 
covert action unaddressed. To James Johnson the question of proper 
authority is a central feature of the just war' doctrine.21 This same 
question has also come to occupy a central place in the charter writing 
debate. Answering the question of who may authorize covert actions 
will be more of a political than philosophical undertaking, yet an 
answer must be provided by any approach which seeks to justify or 
forbid covert actions. 
Thirdly, Lefever's treatment of appropriateness requires elabo-
ration. While acknowledging that certain uses of force are categori-
cally wrong, he presents no detailed outline for evaluating 
appropriateness. More than one path may be followed in constructing 
such a measure. The just war' doctrine suggests that standards be 
developed restricting the means employed (the principle of propor-
tionality) and the targets of that violence (the principle of discrimi-
nation).22 Theodore Shackley takes a more instrumental approach. In 
speaking about the conduct of covert action in the incipient phase of 
a para-military conflict he states that his prescriptions might be termed 
cost effective because they "can save a significant loss of life in later 
phases . . . not to mention the independence of a sovereign state."23 
Finally Lefever fails to address the question of whether the just 
war' standard can be applied in conflict situations falling short of 
declared war. If the concept is not restricted to time of war, it easily 
degenerates into a rationalization for policy makers bent on using 
force. The CIA's (covert) support for the mining of Nicaraguan har-
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bors illustrates the extent to which the 'just war' standard loses its 
supposedly universalistic moral grounding when applied outside of 
war. To United States policy makers the mining of the harbors was 
necessary to accomplish the nation's goals vis-à-vis the Sandinistas. 
The action was pictured as limited in nature and as not posing any 
danger to the civilian population. Nonetheless, to other states, and to 
many people in the United States, this action was an obvious violation 
of international law. 
Adda Bozeman has adopted the opposite approach in seeking to 
find a justification for covert action.24 She asserts that the U.S. relied 
too much on models and has over-generalized the American value 
system in formulating and carrying out foreign policy. Rather, the 
proper test of the fitness of an action lies with the context and the 
cultural and psychological properties of each particular controversy. 
For example, she chides William Colby for not recognizing that his 
Vietnam program was bound to fail "if it had to be carried out in 
strict compliance with American moral and legal standards." She then 
questions his prohibition of assassination or other violations of the 
rules of land warfare while engaging in a guerrilla war where such 
actions played an integral part.25 
Bozeman's approach to justifying covert action gives rise to two 
problems. The first involves diffusion. What will the impact of such 
actions be on American society? Will there be a return flow of ideas 
and actions developed in one cultural context back into the United 
States? If intelligence is viewed as a seamless web involving the inter-
action of intelligence estimating, collection, covert action, and coun-
terintelligence, what will the impact of such activities be upon each 
of these activities? A second problem concerns the United States' 
actual ability to act in the manner which Bozeman suggests. Statecraft, 
she observes, "is in its entirety and everywhere a reflection of a given 
society's sustaining culture and value system." Is the U.S. capable of 
repeatedly stepping outside of its own sustaining culture and value 
system and adapting to the demands, opportunities, and restrictions 
of the world's many cultures without losing all sense of its own identity 
and purpose? If U.S. statecraft is rooted in the American value system, 
to what extent is it possible for Americans to act in ways alien to their 
nature without changing the entire value structure of American so-
ciety? 
Tactical Perspectives 
The tactical literature on covert action is largely journalistic and 
argumentative, and is preoccupied with the para-military and guer-
rilla warfare aspects of the issue. A fundamental weakness of this 
literature has already been noted, namely, an inability to provide 
independent standards by which it can measure its own assertions. 
Further, there is a tendency to address questions of tactics in isolation, 
without reflecting on the broader policy issues which bear directly on 
the use and effectiveness of tactics. This is particularly notable in four 
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areas. First, control and responsibility are assumed, when, in fact, 
such assumptions appear to be unwarranted. The nature of the gov-
ernmental and societal settings in which these operations tend to oc-
cur, added to organizational and personality factors, make slippage 
in the command and control process inevitable.26 Similarly, the me-
chanics and conditions under which a covert action should be ter-
minated is a topic in need of further study. Memoirs and exposés 
provide an overabundance of evidence indicating that very real prob-
lems exist in these areas. 
Second, there is the question of the interaction between covert 
action and other forms of conflict such as conventional warfare and 
nuclear war. Does covert action forestall nuclear confrontation as 
Shackley suggests or does it speed a conflict up the escalation ladder?27 
Third, what is the mechanism by which one state becomes so involved 
in the affairs of another state that it undertakes a major program of 
intervention and how does this affect the selection and effectiveness 
of the tactics adopted.28 Finally, how do the tactics of covert action 
and mechanisms for seizing power relate to the acquisition of legiti-
macy and credibility by those placed in positions of power?29 
One research strategy capable of providing answers to these types 
of questions is the use of focussed comparative case studies. Their 
use has already provided new insights into the areas of deterrence 
and the use of force as a political instrument.30 For the reasons already 
noted, case studies of covert action have fallen short of the standards 
set by research in these areas. Movement in this direction, however, 
has taken place. Richard Immerman's recent study of the CIA-assisted 
overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala, while dealing 
essentially with only one case, contains insights into the strategy and 
tactics of covert actions upon which future studies might profitably 
build.31 
Immerman's research reveals that neither the CIA nor American 
policy makers held any illusions about the difficulty of the task they 
were attempting or of the high risks it entailed. His work also reveals 
a capacity for clear thinking and an attention to detail on the part of 
American officials in putting together the covert action plan. From 
the outset the operation was seen as psychological and political rather 
than military. In selecting a leader for the "revolution" an effort was 
made to avoid too close an identification with either the old rightist 
regime or the military. Efforts were carefully targeted at the group 
upon which Arbenz was most dependent: the wealthy urban class 
which made up most of his officer corps. Attention was given to 
establishing an international climate supportive of an anti-Arbenz 
coup. Lastly, detailed control was exercised over all facets of the op-
eration from gaining Eisenhower's approval for additional planes for 
bombing Guatemala City to engineering a series of juntas and res-
ignations in order that the "right" candidate would emerge as the 
victor in the wake of Arbenz' resignation. 
From Immerman's account we can identify not only the reasons 
27 
Summer 1984 
for success but also those for later failures. For all of their careful 
planning, United States policy makers made one fatal mistake in draw-
ing lessons from their successful operation to remove Arbenz. They 
confused the necessary and sufficient conditions for the success of 
their operation against Arbenz. The careful attention to the details 
of the covert action plan, the control exercised over it, and the ap-
preciation of the risks involved, were necessary for the success of the 
plan but were not sufficient to guarantee success. American policy 
makers did not appreciate the extent to which the success of their 
efforts were dependent upon circumstances within Guatemala. The 
CIA "reaped the harvest" of Arbenz' failure to institute real agricul-
tural reforms which would have cemented ties between the regime 
and the oppressed Indian majority. 
The United States paid a high price for confusing the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for success in the later Bay of Pigs invasion. 
Conventional accounts of the Bay of Pigs episode focus on the irra-
tionalities and inconsistencies of the plan. Immerman argues that the 
CIA plan failed not because of deficiencies inherent in the plan but 
because of Castro's reaction to it. Castro and Che Guevara had both 
concluded that Arbenz' critical mistake was not pursuing reform 
forcefully enough. This left him vulnerable to pressure because he 
lacked a strong base of support from which to challenge the CIA 
sponsored revolutionaries. With such backing they were confident that 
the political and psychological impact of the CIA's operation would 
not have been sufficient to bring down the regime. 
The potential offered by studies firmly grounded in the types of 
frameworks suggested in this essay for improving our understanding 
of intelligence estimating is also illustrated by two recent pieces of 
deception (an integral aspect of covert operations in all of its forms). 
Utilizing experimental evidence, mathematical models, and cognitive 
principles, the findings of Robert Axelrod and Richard Heuer point 
to conditions under which deception is likely to have its biggest payoff.:v-
Axelrod suggests that the rational timing of surprise requires that it 
be held back and used only when the stakes are high and the event 
is rare. One implication of this is, as he notes, that we must resign 
ourselves to having many of our assets wither away if our efforts at 
surprise are to succeed at the critical moment. Heuer suggests that 
deception is most likely to succeed when its purpose is to reinforce 
existing views rather than to alter them. He also asserts that because 
of cognitive biases perfect security is not necessary for deception to 
works. The very sensitivity to the possibility of deception makes people 
believe that strategic deception is more common than it really is. Both 
suggest that the use of Bayesian statistics is one means by which we 
can update our existing beliefs with new information and lessen the 
likelihood of surprise. 
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INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATING 
Policy makers face an international system full of ambiguities and 
uncertainties. Intelligence estimating is an attempt to extract enough 
certainty from this ambiguity to allow policy makers to act. Bureau-
cratic behavior, misperceptions, wishful thinking, and the nature of 
world politics all combine to make this task a difficult one.33 The 
historical record certainly suggests that "threat perception is rarely 
done well."34 Even when the estimate is correct, there is no guarantee 
that policy makers will act in accordance with its findings. Placing 
intelligence into the policy process is easier said than done. Differences 
exist over the definition of intelligence (raw facts or evaluated infor-
mation) and the place of intelligence in the policy process ("on top 
or on tap"). Difficulties such as these have led observers to conclude 
that intelligence failures will always be with us 35 and that the best we 
can expect is a "moderate improvement of average performance" in 
the intelligence process.36 
However, all agree that corrective measures, marginal though 
they may be, must be undertaken. The consequences of intelligence 
failures in an age of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence 
necessitate it. Though the information they contain is highly unstruc-
tured, CIA memoirs and exposés are a potentially rich addition to 
our understanding of intelligence estimating. Their use would pro-
vide a needed corrective to the all too frequent tendency to equate 
intelligence estimating with a formal document such as a "National 
Intelligence Estimate." Intelligence estimating is better viewed as a 
process in which the preparation of a document is only one step. Also 
involved are: setting of collection requirements, collecting informa-
tion, processing and evaluating it, and disseminating the produce.37 
CIA memoirs and exposés provide some of the data needed to follow 
this process from its inception to its conclusion. 
Strategic Surprise and Threat Perception 
Strategic surprise and threat perception are the research concerns 
which have received the most systematic attention by those concerned 
with intelligence estimating. The first efforts in this area were case 
studies of specific instances of strategic surprise.38 Since then work 
has proceeded on a number of levels. Michael Handel has sought to 
establish the outlines of a theoretical framework for investigating stra-
tegic surprise.39 Klaus Knorr has also addressed this problem while 
adding a historical dimension to the study of threat perception.40 An 
important recent contribution is provided by Lawrence Freedman's 
study of post-war United States estimates of the Soviet strategic threat.41 
By investigating the process of threat perception over a long period 
of time and under conditions of "normalcy," his work provides a 
counterweight to studies which focus on a single event where the onset 
of hostilities is imminent.42 His work also provides a useful context in 
which to place the work of those who have focussed more narrowly 
on the debate over the accuracy of recent CIA estimates of the Soviet 
strategic threat.43 
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Two important themes run through these works: the crucial role 
of psychological predispositions and the political nature of threat per-
ception. Together they provide a point of entry for bringing studies 
of the CIA and society to bear on intelligence estimating. Cooper 
notes that forecasters and planners must operate within "the system" 
and that the crisis mentality of Washington makes their task difficult.44 
Freedman expands on this theme by noting that the willingness of an 
intelligence analyst to change his image of the adversary will depend 
on the political environment of the intelligence community.4"' Avi 
Shlaim broadens this observation one step further, asserting that the 
very image of the adversary and the perception of threat will be 
affected by the existing national consensus and prevailing social and 
political views.46 
Such forces can clearly be seen at work in the establishment of 
Team B.47 Logically there is no reason not to have established, or now 
establish, a team which would operate from the assumption that the 
Soviets are nonexpansionist or concerned only with self protection. 
The Team B model of Soviet politics is not the only alternative model 
available. John Reshetar identifies three types of theories of Russian 
political behavior as well as five persistent syndromes to their be-
havior.48 Used in conjunction with public documents, CIA memoirs 
and exposés offer the opportunity to observe the impact of percep-
tions and political influences on an intelligence estimate as well as to 
trace their roots back to broader societal and institutional influences. 
Forecasting Literature 
The policy relevance of many of the concepts, variables, and 
measurement techniques developed in academia have long been ques-
tioned by practitioners and scholars. Intelligence estimating is no ex-
ception. Knorr observes that taken as a group intelligence officers are 
not enthusiastic about social science contributions to their work, es-
pecially in the areas of interpretation and generalization.4il Angelo 
Codevilla, of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, argues that 
"intelligence is a practical matter not a theoretical one."5" Richard 
Pipes, head of the B Team, asserts that it is dangerous for intelligence 
analysts to search for models. A historian himself, he feels that history 
and the humanities are the proper training grounds for intelligence 
analysts.51 Michael O'Leary's study of the applicability of quantitative 
social science skills to the concerns of the State Department's Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research reaches similarly pessimistic conclusions 
about the policy relevance of scholarly research efforts in this field.52 
With observations such as these in mind, it is easier to understand 
why insights rooted in the heavily quantitative forecasting literature 
have been met with skepticism by those concerned with understanding 
and improving intelligence estimating. This rejection may be pre-
mature. William Ascher, in a recent review of forecasting efforts in 
such diverse forecasting fields as population, economics, energy, 
transportation, and technology, concluded that the choice of a meth-
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odology is only of secondary importance or obvious after one's core 
assumptions are selected.53 He maintains that these are the major 
determinants of a forecast's accuracy for two reasons. First, in line 
with our previous discussion, the expectations attached to sophisti-
cated methodological techniques have exceeded their actual perform-
ance. Second, a technique or approach is rarely used alone or in 
isolation from other techniques or approaches. This produces a 'can-
celling out effect' which reduces the unique contribution of any one 
technique. Following this logic, he concludes that different forecasts 
tend to emerge from different organizational settings, not because of 
any greater methodological accuracy, but because of different insti-
tutional biases. Approached from this perspective, the ability of fore-
casting literature to add to our understanding of intelligence estimating 
should not be readily dismissed. Both Lee and Freedman found as-
sumptions played a central role in their studies of CIA estimates of 
the Soviet strategic threat54 which suggests that much might be learned 
by systematically examining the ways in which core assumptions are 
developed, maintained and changed. 
The Politicization of Intelligence 
The utility of employing conceptual frameworks to study intel-
ligence estimating can be illustrated by examining the charge fre-
quently leveled against the Reagan administration, namely, that it has 
politicized the relationship between the policy maker and the analyst.55 
An understanding of the dynamics of the intelligence estimating proc-
ess and of the governmental and domestic context within which the 
CIA operated reveals this charge to irrelevant. Intelligence estimating 
is and always has been politicized. What is occurring instead is the 
publicization of intelligence estimating. 
The intelligence function, even when narrowly defined, requires 
more than simply presenting policy makers with information. It re-
quires that the information be analyzed and evaluated for its credi-
bility and accuracy. In carrying out the intelligence function a division 
of labor between the analyst and policy maker is typically held to exist. 
The former uses professional expertise to evaluate information while 
the latter decides upon the appropriate course of action. Reality is 
quite different. Intelligence and policy are intrinsically linked. An 
apolitical relationship cannot and has not existed between the policy 
maker and the intelligence analyst. 
Two forces guarantee that the relationship of the policy maker 
and the intelligence analyst will be political. The first force lies with 
the fundamental characteristics of bureaucracy. Harold Wilensky has 
observed that in all organizations hierarchy, specialization, and cen-
tralization are major sources of intelligence blockage and distortion. 
As definitive characteristics of bureaucracy, the inescapable conclusion 
is that intelligence failures are to some degree unavoidable. Policy 
makers clearly cannot accept such a fatalistic conclusion and must 
seek to extract high quality intelligence from their intelligence bur-
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eaucracies. Wilensky suggests that typically this will require bypassing 
the organization's conventional ranking system. American presidents 
have taken Wilensky's observations to heart. While solutions have 
varied, the lesson learned is the same; the normal place of division 
of labor, SOP's, and areas of operational autonomy will often need 
to be displaced by the injection of overriding political considerations 
into the decision making process.56 
The second force is the nature of management in a public bu-
reaucracy. Management in a public bureaucracy is unlike that in a 
nonpublic organization.57 The distinguishing factor is the effect of 
political contact and influences on the internal structure and operation 
of the organization. This is especially true when examining the role 
of the president in the administrative process. An examination of 
presidential priorities and perspectives over the last several decades 
reveals two important developments for understanding the political 
nature of the relationship between policy maker and analyst. First, 
they have tended to be significantly different from those represented 
elsewhere, yet contemporaneously, in the political system. Second, in 
order to govern each president has felt compelled to use the White 
House as a base for mobilizing and building the equivalent of a pres-
idential party.58 
These managerial considerations impinge on intelligence esti-
mating in the evaluation of the intelligence product. Information may 
be accepted by the policy maker as true or false, but it will not be 
treated as neutral.59 Information is a political resource; it does more 
than simply rationalize the decision making process. Information en-
hances authority, shapes careers, and is an instrument for building 
public support for policies. Most importantly, it is a source of power 
for both the policy maker and the analyst and is recognized as such 
by both. The result is that policy makers tend to adopt a defensive 
attitude toward evaluation and to stress politically oriented evaluative 
criteria.60 Two evaluative considerations contemplated frequently by 
politicians deal with constituency reaction and mobilization of support 
for favorite policies; neither has much to do with intelligence. 
Politicization is inevitable. Publicization as it currently exists is 
not. Steps can be taken to redress the imbalance between secrecy and 
publicity currently characterizing this policy area. Because the altered 
policy environment is, at best, only partly under the control of policy 
makers, efforts to curb the publicization of intelligence estimating 
directed at this level will not be likely to yield significant returns. 
Attention must be directed at altering the tactics and strategies em-
ployed by policy makers and analysts. 
The policy maker must come to accept that a certain amount of 
bureaucratic "subversion" is inevitable. The bureaucrat faces multiple, 
and often competing, pressures in formulating a policy or course of 
action. Whether it be conceived of in terms of different types of 
responsibility (objective versus subjective) or competing imperatives 
(legal, bureaucratic-rational, consensual) tension between the policy 
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maker and the bureaucrat is inevitable. Rather than seek to eliminate 
these tensions or drive them underground, the policy maker must 
seek to channel and direct them into certain areas and to minimize 
their impact in others. 
The intelligence analyst must come to accept as legitimate political 
directives in the structuring of the intelligence estimating process. 
They cannot nor should not be rejected out of hand. An acceptance 
of these realities by both parties would go far in limiting the pressures 
in publicizing the intelligence estimating process. Disagreements would 
not be ended but the "rules" for dealing with them would effectively 
eliminate the more negative consequences which publicization has 
had. 
The unprecedented publicization of intelligence estimating can 
be traced to developments operating at two different levels. One set 
of forces grows out of the altered environment in which intelligence 
estimating is carried out. No matter how powerful they may appear, 
governmental agencies are only part of a larger political system and 
do not operate independently of it. Changes in the formal structure 
or norms of the political system will have an impact on how bureau-
cratic politics are played. The first change involves a dramatic shift 
in the conventional wisdom on the proper direction of organizational 
reform efforts. The move has been away from expanding bureaucratic 
autonomy and toward curtailing it. The goal is to make bureaucracies 
more responsible by bringing them back into the political system. A 
second and related change involves a generalized weakening of public 
faith in professional expertise. Scientific or technological measures 
are no longer readily accepted as the answers to modern problems. 
To many, they have become the source of problems rather than so-
lutions. A third change stems from American policy in Vietnam and 
its impact on the elite consensus on the nature and purpose of Amer-
ican foreign policy. A fourth change lies in a reordering of the re-
lationship between the media and government in the national security 
area. As was recently highlighted by the invasion of Grenada, the 
long-standing pattern of mutual trust and cooperation has been re-
placed by confrontation. Clandestine activity was among the first tar-
gets of this new breed of investigative journalism and has remained 
one of its staples. 
A second level of explanation centers on the leadership styles 
developed by recent policy makers. While pursuing widely differing 
policy priorities, Presidents Carter and Reagan have followed a similar 
tactical path. Both successfully campaigned on and-Washington themes 
and each has used the White House as a pulpit from which to preach 
his own political faith. Further, both attempted to overcome govern-
mental resistance to their programs by going directly to the American 
people for support. An important element in this strategy has been 
the use of intelligence estimates to bolster a given case. The Reagan 
administration, for example, has relied on intelligence material in 
arguments about the presence of a Communist threat in Central 
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America and for Russian culpability in the shooting down of the 
Korean airliner. This has produced the inevitable reaction on the part 
of its opponents who publicly challenge these estimates and put for-
ward competing ones. 
The net result is that intelligence estimating has become a dif-
ferent type of issue than it had been in the past. Categorizing it, 
however, is not easy. Intelligence estimating had been traditionally 
viewed as a step in the policy process and did not fit neatly into any 
of the conventional typologies used to characterize public policies. 
The standard logic behind these typologies now suggests that a change 
has occurred as the key factor defining them is almost universally 
agreed to be the stakes involved.61 The distribution of winners and 
losers plus the division of costs and benefits among them is largely 
held to determine the decision making pattern and the allocation of 
influence. 
In intelligence the stakes have changed. At a minimum, intelli-
gence estimating has been transformed from an issue area in which: 
there existed a limited number of like minded actors, professional 
expertise dominated political directive, and, internal control mecha-
nisms were relied upon. It has altered to one in which: a large number 
of actors are present who often hold conflicting value orientations, 
the dominance of professional expertise has become problematic, and, 
greater reliance is placed on external control mechanisms. Winners 
and losers have become easier to identify. The distribution of costs 
and benefits now fluctuates between zero sum and non-zero sum con-
ditions. No development better symbolizes this change than the un-
precedented inclusion of sections on intelligence in the 1976 Democratic 
Party and 1980 Republican Party platforms. 
This movement toward the publicization of intelligence repre-
sents a real corrupting influence on the policy maker/analyst rela-
tionship. The negative impact of excessive secrecy on the quality of 
decision making is widely acknowledged.62 Excessive publicity holds 
equally undesirable consequences for intelligence estimating. It in-
creases the likelihood that the potential abuses inherent in any political 
relationship will surface by expanding the range of permissible be-
havior and by altering the incentive structure for each party. Periodic 
outbursts of publicity—and the corresponding behavior patterns— 
have taken place with a great deal of regularity. The 1950s saw a very 
public intelligence debate over the "bomber gap" and then the "missile 
gap". The 1970s saw highly contentious public intelligence debates 
over the ABM and Soviet MIRV capabilities.63 
Judging whether or not the Reagan administration has acceler-
ated the process of publicization or is just blending it with an ongoing 
trend is less easy to establish conclusively. Still, the impression has 
been created that an acceleration has occurred. Two factors distin-
guish the Carter and Reagan administrations which reinforce this 
impression. First, there is the point in the life of the administration 
at which publicization began. While from the outset the Carter ad-
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ministation sought to make intelligence estimates more available, it 
did not immediately go public with them on any highly controversial 
issues. Virtually from the outset the Reagan administration began 
publicly to use intelligence estimates to build a case for its foreign 
policy initiatives. Responsibility for yellow rain, the destruction of 
KAL 007, Soviet support for international terrorism, and Soviet and 
Cuban support for insurgencies in Central America are all topics 
which have been highly publicized during the Reagan administration. 
Second, there is a difference in the vehemence with which con-
troversial policies have been pursued. The Carter administration did 
not pursue a hard and fast line on foreign policy issues. The difficulties 
which it had in deciding upon a course of action dulled the impact 
of any one estimate. No position was ever the final one and compro-
mises were always forthcoming. The Reagan administration has been 
far less yielding regarding its interpretation of intelligence or the 
policies it deems necessary. This has increased the importance of 
intelligence estimates in the policy process and made them a focal 
point for opponents. Challenging the premises of a policy becomes 
one of the few tactics holding any likelihood of influencing the de-
velopment of policy. 
SUMMARY 
Covert action and intelligence estimating do not exhaust the range 
of issues which merit attention in studying the CIA. The nature of 
the relationship between the CIA and American society is a subject 
needing investigation. The literature on civil-military relations, the 
diffusion or spread of institutions and process from one society to 
another, and science, technology, and public policy are three poten-
tially valuable sources of conceptual material for examining this re-
lationship. Also worthy of additional study is the organizational nature 
of the CIA. Noticeably absent in the literature on the CIA are rigorous 
efforts to understand its organizational dimension. Instead one finds 
an overabundance of references to the presence of bureaucratic pol-
itics. An organization theory based perspective would provide an op-
portunity for a thorough examination of the interaction between the 
CIA's structure, decision making process, and product. To repeat the 
point made earlier, "being intelligent about secret intelligence 
agencies"64 requires movement beyond memoirs and exposés. Along 
with public documents, they have substantially increased our knowl-
edge about the CIA.65 They cannot, however, take us as far as we 
need to go. For this we must begin integrating studies of the CIA into 
the broader literature in the political and social sciences. Whether 
pursued from one perspective or many, the results of studies of the 
CIA such as those suggested above cannot be expected to provide 
conclusive answers. The task now is to raise questions, nurture mean-
ingful debate, and point the way for additional studies of the CIA 
and the intelligence community. 
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